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cipal case on the theory that the bond that he signed was conditioned for
the faithful performance of duties by the defendant justice, said bond
in fact covering the misconduct for which the plaintiff sought damages.
If the Ohio courts are reluctant to hold the surety to a greater extent
of liability, by strict enforcement of the bond than that allegedly con-
templated by the statute the defendant surety could still be held liable
by the court's adoption of the view expressed in the notary public cases.
If it were held that a commitment for contempt is a ministerial act, the
bond on which suit was brought would cover such misconduct. However,
if the courts would not deem such a position tenable, liability on the part
of the surety could still be imposed on the assumption that the legislature
intended the liability of the surety to be co-extensive with that of the
justice of the peace. On this theory, a broader interpretation of the
phrase "ministerial duties," as used in the statute, would have to be
placed thereon than was made in the principal case. It is possible to con-
strue the statute to cover all but proper judicial acts done within the
justice's jurisdiction. If none of these positions is acceptable to the courts
of Ohio, it would seem that the statute should be amended to afford
adequate redress, when considered in the light of the legislature's obvious
purpose in requiring such bond to be given as a prerequisite to the justice
entering into the performance of his duties.
MARGARETTA BEYNON
TRUSTS
DEVIATION FROM THE TERMS OF A TRUST
Rufas A. Washburn, in his will, devised certain property to his
executrix, in trust, providing that the property shall not be sold during
the lifetime of his wife, Bessie Washburn, "but the first charge upon
the income shall be a liberal provision for my said wife, during the bal-
ance of her natural life." By a subsequent item, the will provides that a
sum shall be paid for the support of a blind granddaughter, this provision
to continue as long as the wife shall live. "But the same shall only be
paid out of the excess remaining after a comfortable maintenance for
my said wife is provided." The residue of the estate, was devised to a
son and a daughter. Since the death of the testator, the property has
fallen into disrepair to such an extent that the income has been greatly
reduced. Necessary repairs and taxes will more than consume the
income and there will be nothing left to supply "a liberal provision for
my said wife." The wife, as executrix and trustee under the will, asks
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for a construction permitting her to sell such part of the estate as may
be necessary to pay the taxes, repair the remainder, and provide thereby
a "comfortable maintenance" for herself. In a unanimous decision, the
Court of Appeals for the Second District held that it had not the power
to modify the provisions of a will to meet changed circumstances and
needs of the beneficiary of a testamentary trust.' Although the court
expressed a sincere sympathy for the widow, "and sought for some
means to give her relief," they could find no authority which would
permit of a construction to empower the executrix to sell a portion of
the estate in the face of the express provision in the will not to sell.
The decision is clearly in accord with the present status of the law
in Ohio. A well-reasoned decision, written by Judge Robinson and
concurred in by four other judges of the Supreme Court, in 1921, estab-
lished the rule that "the changed circumstances and needs of the bene-
ficiary do not justify a court in modifying the provisions of a will to
meet the changed circumstances and conditions. The theory that the
testator, had he foreseen the changed circumstances and conditions,
would have provided a different and larger income is an assumption
merely and is no excuse for the usurpation by the court of the right tc
dispose of testator's property in a way different from that by him
directed." ' It is upon the authority of this Supreme Court ruling that
the decision in the principal case is based.
The argument of the majority in the Alter case is based on the
theory that if the court, a stranger to the motive which controlled the
testator, is to assume to amend his will because such amendment would
in their judgment provide a more beneficial result to the legatee, there
is little purpose in retaining the wills statute, which confers upon every
legally capable person the right to dispose of his property as he chooses.
From the standpoint of the wills statute, the argument can scarcely be
impeached. The court recognized, however, that in extreme cases in
England, and in certain jurisdictions in America, courts have permitted
a deviation from the terms of a will under the guise of doing what the
court believed the testator would have done had he foreseen the situa-
tion, but denied that any such invasion into the rights of a testator had
ever been made in Ohio, and failed to recognize any benefit to be
derived from such invasion. It is to this last point that Chief Justice
Marshall, in his dissenting opinion, takes exception, and presents a more
liberal and, in the opinion of the writer, preferable view.
The argument of the former Chief Justice is based on the inherent
jurisdiction of courts of equity over trusts. He pointed out that it is
'Washturn v. Guild, 25 Ohio Abs. 1 (1937).
2 Union Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Alter, io3 Ohio St. 88, 3z N.E. 834 (09Z0).
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often necessary to deviate from the letter of the trust where it has
become impossible or grossly inequitable to strictly follow it. The pur-
pose of such relief is not to change entirely the purposes of the trust, but
it is to carry into effect the spirit and general intent of the settlor. The
Ohio courts have not hesitated to do this under their cy pres powers in
the case of charitable trusts.'
Many courts in other jurisdictions have, in regard to private trusts,
exercised a power somewhat similar to the cy pres power. A common
expression of this power is found in an early Illinois case, where the court
said: "Exigencies often arise not contemplated by the party creating the
trust, and which, had they been anticipated, would undoubtedly have
been provided for, where the aid of the court of chancery must be
invoked to grant relief imperatively required; and in such cases the
court must, as far as may be, occupy the place of the party creating the
trust, and do with the fund what he would have dictated had he antici-
pated the emergency." 4 The examples are legion where courts have
made similar statements in permitting or ordering a deviation.' All of
these cases, however, except those based on statutes hereinafter discussed,
have recognized that the deviation has been to preserve the trust, that
the court's power in such a situation "depends not on expediency, but on
exigency."' There must be something more than a mere advantage to
be gained by the cestit; the trust itself must be in danger of destruction.
This is particularly true where there is an express prohibition; but even
if a sale has not been expressly forbidden, the courts will not grant a
power of sale because such sale would secure a greater income and thus
'Mclntire's Admrs. and Zanesville Canal & Mfg. Co. v. City of Zanesville, 17 Ohio
St. 352 (1867); City of Cincinnati v. McMicken, 6 C.C. 188 (1892); Carr v. Trustees
of Lane Seminary, zi Ohio Abs. 107, 5 Ohio 0. 272 (1935).
'Curtiss v. Brown, 29 Ill. 201, 229 (1862).
rPennington v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, 65 N.J.Eq. 11, 55 AtI. 468 (1903);
In re Pulitzer's Estate, 265 N.Y. 522, 249 N.Y.Supp. 87, 139 Misc. 575, 193 N.E. 30Z
(i93i) court sanctioned sale of failing newspaper corporation, notwithstanding settlor's
direction that there should be no sale; Bibb v. Bibb, 204 Ala. 541, 86 So. 376 (192o) no
power of sale given, but sale granted where property depreciated and subject to tax liens;
Hewitt v. Beattie, so6 Conn. 6oz, 138 Atl. 795 (1927) stone quarry could no longer be
operated at a profit; Hale v. Hale, 146 Il. 227, 33 N.E. 858, 20 L.R.A. 247 (1893)
property unproductive and subject to heavy taxes and assessments, so that sale necessary to
save investment; Johns v. Montgomery, 265 11. 2s, xo6 N.E. 497, Ann. Cases, 19i6A,
996 (1914) land left for agriculture unproductive and could better be sold for building
lots; Cary v. Cary, 309 IIL 330, 141 N.E. x56 (1923) farming land better suited for
subdivision purposes; Suiter v. McWard, 328 Ill. 462, 159 N.E. 799 (i928) land subject
to mortgage and tax charges, sale of part necessary to save the rest; Security-First Nat.
Bank of Los Angeles v. Easter, 136 C.A. 691, 29 Pac. (2d) 422 (1934); Mayall v.
Mayall, 63 Minn. 511, 65 N.W. 942 (1896) property unproductive, sale necessary to
avoid tax or mortgage sale; Ruggles v. Tyson, 104 Wis. 500, 79 N.W. 766, 48 L.R.A.
809 (z899) sale necessary to prevent tax sale; Colonial Trust Co. v. Brown, soS Conn.
z6z, 135 Atl. ssS (1926); Young v. Young, 255 Mich. 173, 237 N.W. 535, 77 A.L.R.
963 (1931); Mann v. Mann, i22 Me. 468, 12o At. S41 (1923) statute permitted sale;
Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, Vol. 3, Sec. s61.
o Weakley v. Barrow, 137 Tenn. 224, 192 S.W. 927 (1917).
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a more beneficial result to the cestui.7 In the principal case, although it
will be much more beneficial for the cestui to sell part of the trust estate,
it is also highly probable that the trust property itself may be lost through
tax sale. The case does not show that any such sale was immediately
threatened, but even if it had been the court would still have refused
the relief sought. The alternative presented to the trustee-that of
mortgaging the property-is itself a wasting of the estate which, through
foreclosure, may very well result in a destruction of the trust. It is
unfortunate that the intent of the settlor to provide adequately for his
widow should be thwarted by such rigid adherence to the strict letter of
the instrument creating the trust.
The chief strength of a court of equity lies in the discretionary power
with which it is vested. Because of this power, equity is not bound by
the strict formalism which fetters our courts of law. This freedom is
clearly seen in the field of specific performance of contracts, where the
equity court is not forced to construe literally the words of the parties to
an agreement, but may look to the substance to find the actual intention
of the parties.' And, since jurisdiction over trusts is inherently in the
court of equity, this same power of discretion should be given the court
in that class of cases. It must be remembered, however, that in the
principal case, the Court of Appeals was bound by the Supreme Court's
decision in the Alter case, and on the basis of that decision was denied
the power to exercise such discretion. But, as has been pointed out,
many courts have exercised this inherent power in their administration
of trusts. Many other states have conferred it upon their courts by
statute.' Under several of these statutes, the discretionary power of the
'In re Tollcmache, (1903) C h. (Eng.) 4575 Johns v. Johns, 172 Ill. 472, 50
N.E. 337 (x8 9 8); Hackett's Ex'rs. v. Hackett's Devisees, i8o Ky. 406, zoz S.W. 864
(x91S) refused to deviate from terms to allow investment in realty instead of "in good
and safe securities" in absence of showing that failure to invest in realty would result in
loss of trust estate; In re Davis, 14 Allen (Mass.) z4 (1867); Oliver v. Oliver, 3 N.J.Eq.
368 (x835)5 Stephens v. Collison, 274 Ill. 389, 113 N.E. 691, Ann. Cases, 19i8D, 559
(x9x6), Russel v. Russel, io9 Conn. 187, 145 At!. 648 (1929); Weakley v. Barrow,
suprai Matter of Roe, 6 N.Y.Supp. 464, 53 Hun. 433, affirmed in 119 N.Y. 509, 23 N.E.
xo63 (x889)5 Matter of Caswell, 197 Wis. 3Z7, zzz N.W. 235 (1928).
' Rummington v. Kelley, 7 Ohio (part z) pp. 99, oz (dictum), (836)5 Curtis v.
The Factory Site Co., xz Ohio App. 148, 31 C.C. (N.S.) 65, motion to dismiss petition in
error sustained in 17 Ohio L.R. 39z, 65 Bull. i5 (1919); Woloveck v. Schueler, ig Ohio
App. ZIo, 23 Ohio L.R. 26z, error not prosecuted (9zz).
' Ala. Code (19z8) sees. 10438-10440; Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) secs. 59zS-59z6
Ga. Civil Code (i9z6) sees. 3754-376z5 Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stat. (927) c. 22, sec. 5O;
Ind. Burns' Ann. St. (1933) secs. 56-6zi5 Ky. Acts (1934) c. 128, sec. 4708-I; Me. R.S.
(930) c. 8z, sec. 1o; Md. Ann. Code (1924) art. 16, sec. 264; Mass. Gen. Laws (59z)
c. 203, sec. z6; Mich. Comp. L. (1929) sees. 14397, 14398; Minn. Stat. (9Z7) sec.
Sxooi Public Stat. N.H. (x9z6) c. 309, sec. 13; N.J. 4 Comp. St. (910) p. 4684, secs.
z3-z65 Cahill's Consol. L. N.Y. (1930) c. Si, see i5; Oregon Code (1930) sees 6-sos to
6-8s6; Pardon's Pa. St. (1936) title 20, sec. i561; R.I. Gen. Laws (1923) sec. 4406;
Vt. Gen. L. (192) c. 79, sec. 1; Va. Code (930) sec. 5335 (1936) c. 217i 'wis. St.
(1931) sec. 231.21.
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courts has been extended, permitting them to order a sale when there
is not such an emergency as would be necessary to permit a sale in the
absence of the statute. Such expressions as "when advisable," "when for
the best interest,". "when desirable," etc., as found in these statutes, are
all evidences of the expanding authority granted to our courts of equity.
It is indeed unfortunate, however, that such statutes should be neces-
sary in order for equity to exercise a power with which, by its very
nature, that branch of our jurisprudence is inherently endowed. In the
case under discussion, the testator stipulated that his estate should not be
sold during his wife's lifetime; but twice he expressed the desire that the
income from the estate should be applied first to the providing of a
comfortable maintenance for his wife. It would seem a permissible
construction from these two facts that the dominant intention of the
testator was to liberally provide for his widow. In fact, his very reason
for prohibiting the sale undoubtedly was to assure that liberal provision
for her. It seems also permissible to assume that had he foreseen the
present situation, such a prohibition would never have been made. By
granting the relief prayed for here, the Court of Appeals would have
provided an entering wedge by which the Supreme Court could have
modified its decision in the Alter case; it would have provided a basis
upon which relief could be granted in such cases of apparent need. The
jurisdiction of equity is an expanding one. Although its principles are
based on precedent and not on the whim or consicence of the chancellor,
it nevertheless is capable of adapting itself to the exigency as it arises.
If in the exercise of its peculiar jurisdiction over trusts, equity is incapable
of meeting such an exigency when it arises, but instead must rigidly
adhere to the latter rather than to the spirit of the trust, there is little
reason for equity's continuing that peculiar jurisdiction; it may as well be
remanded to the law courts. As the law of Ohio now stands, however,
manifested by the principal case and by the Alter case, our equity courts
are met by such an incapacity. To remove that incapacity, and permit
the court to exercise a mitigating jurisdiction seems to the writer to be
the preferable course. Whether some liberal court will see fit to over-
rule this precedent by subsequent decision, or whether the legislature
will do so by statute, is a question that only future decisions or legislation
can answer.
JAMES F. BELL, JR.
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